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legal and legislative issues

Meeting the Needs of
Students with Disabilities
By Charles J. Russo, J.D., Ed.D. & Allan G. Osborne, Jr., Ed.D.

The disparity
between what
Congress promised
and what it delivers
creates ﬁnancial
challenges for
education leaders as
they seek funding
to provide for all
students.
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T

he Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA, 2005) requires
states, through local school boards,
to provide students with disabilities with a free appropriate public education
(FAPE) in the least restrictive environment
consistent with the content of their Individualized Education Programs (IEPs). As important
as it is to educate students with disabilities, the
cost of serving these children is much higher
than that of their peers in regular education.

In the IDEA, Congress included language
stipulating that the federal government
would pay up to 40% of the excess cost
associated with educating children with disabilities (20 U.S.C.A. § 1411(a)(2) (A)(ii))).
However, Congress has never come close to
providing this level of funding. The disparity between what Congress promised and
what it delivers creates ﬁnancial challenges
for education leaders as they seek funding to
provide for all students.
The ﬁrst Supreme Court review of the
Education for All Handicapped Children
Act, renamed the IDEA in 1990, addressed
the level of services to be afforded children
with disabilities. In Board of Education of
the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley (1982), a dispute from New
York over whether a student with a hearing
impairment was entitled to the services of
a sign-language interpreter, the Supreme
Court ruled that the local board did not
have to provide her with such assistance.
The Court held that the board only had
to offer the student a program providing
“some educational beneﬁt” (p. 200) rather
than one designed to maximize her abilities.
Over the years, while paying lip service to
the importance of Rowley’s “some educational beneﬁt” standard, the Third Circuit
(Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate
Unit 16, 1988, p. 184; Oberti v. Board of
Education of the Borough of Clementon
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School District, 1993) and Sixth Circuit
(Deal ex rel. Deal v. Hamilton County
Department of Education, 2004) upped the
ante by requiring boards to provide students
with IEPs with programs affording them
“meaningful beneﬁt.”
Most recently, the Tenth Circuit upheld
Rowley’s “some educational beneﬁt”
standard in Endrew F. v. Douglas County
School District RE-1 (2015). In Endrew F.,
the panel afﬁrmed that a school board in
Colorado complied with the IDEA by providing a child with autism with a program
granting him “some educational beneﬁt.”
Later courts have interpreted this standard
as requiring more than trivial or de minimis
educational progress, adding to the confusion by failing to deﬁne what boards must
provide.
In light of the split between federal circuit
courts, the Supreme Court entered the fray
over the level of services school boards must
provide students with disabilities in order to
establish a national standard.
Endrew F. v. Douglas County
School District RE-1
Endrew F. involved a student in Colorado
with autism and attention deﬁcit hyperactivity disorder whose disabilities affected his
cognitive functioning, language, and reading skills along with his social and adaptive abilities. The student attended a public
school from preschool to fourth grade,
receiving special education and related
services pursuant to his IEP. The child’s
parents, dissatisﬁed with their son’s progress
in fourth grade, rejected the IEP educators
developed for the ﬁfth grade, removed him
from the public school, and enrolled him in
a private school that specialized in educating
children with autism.
On removing their son from the public school and placing him in the private
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setting, the parents ﬁled a due process complaint seeking tuition reimbursement for the latter. The parents
claimed that public school ofﬁcials
committed procedural errors by
not adequately reporting their son’s
progress, not conducting a functional behavioral assessment (FBA),
and not implementing a behavior
intervention plan (BIP). The parents
further contended that the proposed
IEP was substantively inadequate
because it did not allow their son to
make meaningful progress in school.
Judicial History
Convinced that school ofﬁcials
provided the child with a FAPE,
an administrative law judge (ALJ)
denied the parents’ request for
tuition reimbursement. Subsequently, in an unpublished opinion,
the federal trial court in Colorado
upheld the ALJ’s adjudication on the
basis that the parents failed to prove
board ofﬁcials violated the IDEA by
not providing their son with a FAPE
(Endrew F. v. Douglas County
School District RE-1, 2014).
On further review, the Tenth
Circuit afﬁrmed in favor of the
school board (Endrew F. v. Douglas
County School District RE-1, 2015).
As an initial matter, the panel agreed
that the procedural errors the parents alleged did not deny their son
a FAPE. While educators conceded
that their descriptions of the child’s
progress on the IEP could have been
better, the court relied on substantial
evidence in the record that the parents were well aware of the student’s
progress and actively participated in
his education.
The court pointed out that the
parents were in constant communication with their son’s teacher via
face-to-face meetings as well as a
notebook they sent back and forth
about his behavior and other school
activities. In addition, educators
sent the parents quarterly progress
reports along with report cards.
Therefore, the court was satisﬁed
that any gaps in reporting on the
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goals and objectives of the child’s
IEP did not prevent the parents from
participating meaningfully in their
son’s education.
The Tenth Circuit was unable
to uncover the procedural defect
the parents alleged when educators chose not to conduct an FBA
or develop a BIP for their son.
Noting that the student was never
subjected to a disciplinary change
in placement, the court remarked
that the IDEA required educators
only to consider behavioral interventions. According to the court,
educators met their duty because
the IEPs included behavior plans
that identiﬁed some of the child’s
problem behaviors and spelled out
ways to manage and reduce his
misbehaviors.

The issue presented
in Endrew F., namely
whether children with
disabilities should receive
educational programming
designed to provide
“some education beneﬁt”
or “meaningful beneﬁt”
is, to say the least,
difﬁcult and will likely be
costly for school boards.
On another aspect of the procedural issue, the court recognized that
educators were in regular contact
with the parents about their son’s
actions as administrators arranged
for autism and behavioral specialists to meet with his team to devise
a new IEP for the child. The court
observed that the new IEP was never
implemented because the parents
withdrew their son from school.
These facts persuaded the court
that the record was ﬁlled with ways
in which educators dealt with the
child’s behavioral issues. In sum,
the court agreed that board ofﬁcials
complied with the IDEA by considering behavioral interventions in

determining that the child did not
need a formal FBA and/or BIP.
The court began its analysis of
the parents’ substantive challenges
to their son’s IEP by reviewing their
claim that the Tenth Circuit adopted
the heightened meaningful educational beneﬁt standard by which to
judge the adequacy of his FAPE. Citing its own precedent (Urban v. Jefferson County School District R-1,
1996; Thompson R2-J School District v. Luke P., 2008), the court dismissed this claim, emphasizing that
it always “subscribed to the Rowley
Court’s ‘some educational beneﬁt’
language in deﬁning a FAPE” (p.
1338). In fact, the court explained
that it speciﬁcally declined to follow
the higher standard of meaningful
educational beneﬁt advanced by the
Third Circuit (Sytsema v. Academy
School District No. 20, 2008).
Rounding its analysis, the court
considered whether the board’s
proposed IEP met Rowley’s “some
educational beneﬁt” standard. Relying on evidence of progress the child
made under his previous IEPs, the
court agreed that this strongly suggested that the IEP proposed for
his ﬁfth grade year was reasonably
calculated to confer educational beneﬁt. The court also decided that the
child’s annual goals and objectives
increased in difﬁculty from one year
to the next, reﬂecting the progress he
was making.
Further, the court concluded that
educators worked collaboratively
with the child’s parents as well as
other service providers to address his
behaviors as they arose while calling
in specialists to address his actions
when they escalated and so afﬁrmed
that the proposed IEP offered the
child a FAPE.
Discussion
In a perfect world, districts would
not have to worry about having adequate ﬁnancial resources to serve all
children. However, at a time when
the economy is less than robust,
acquiring the resources to educate
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all children presents educators with
challenges. At the same time, educators do not want to be forced to
make utilitarian judgments about
which children are entitled to costly
educational services.
The issue presented in Endrew F.,
namely whether children with disabilities should receive educational
programming designed to provide
“some education beneﬁt” or “meaningful beneﬁt” is, to say the least,
difﬁcult and will likely be costly for
school boards. Moreover, while the
Supreme Court is one member short
of a full bench insofar as the late
Justice Scalia has yet to be replaced,
its having granted review more than
seven months after his passing suggests that the Justices will reach a
majority judgment on the appropriate standard.
Regardless of what standard the
Supreme Court enunciates, it is
important to recall that the “I” in
IDEA stands for “individuals.” In
other words, the Court cannot create a “one size ﬁts all” standard for
children with disabilities. Even if the
Court creates a clearer standard, a
meaningful beneﬁt for one child may
be a minimal beneﬁt for another
student.
Consequently, regardless of the
outcome in Endrew F., courts likely
will continue evaluating the standard on a case-by-case basis in light
of each child’s unique needs. Such
an outcome is not necessarily bad
because each case will help develop
a clearer understanding of what is
required of school boards even as
doing so raises costs when they must
provide heightened levels of services.
Disputes over the appropriate
standard for providing FAPEs for
students with disabilities are not
exercises in semantics. “Some”
can mean more than nothing while
“meaningful” suggests something
extra. While some courts have used
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“meaningful” to describe a standard
as being more than trivial, the Third
Circuit made it clear that it referred
to a standard designed to confer
signiﬁcant beneﬁts on students. Even
though this standard sets a higher
criterion, it stops short of ordering
boards to offer the best possible education or one maximizing the potential of children.

Even though this standard
sets a higher criterion, it
stops short of ordering
boards to offer the best
possible education or one
maximizing the potential
of children.
If anything, should the Supreme
Court mandate a “meaningful beneﬁt” standard requiring more than
de minimis programming in Endrew
F., it is unlikely to end litigation over
what constitutes a FAPE. Instead,
debates will rage over whether children must receive programming
designed to help them achieve in a
manner consistent with their abilities
by having educational opportunities
equal to those of their classmates
who are not disabled. What remains
of paramount importance for SBOs,
their boards, and other educational
leaders, are questions about how
much more such a change would
cost school systems dealing with
already tight budgets and whether
Congress will offer additional ﬁnancial aid to enable boards to educate
all children equitably.
Conclusion
Whether the Supreme Court
unequivocally establishes a clear
standard of educational programming school boards must offer students with disabilities in Endrew F.
remains to be seen. Yet, even if the
Court creates such a standard, given
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the individualized nature of IEPs,
achieving it can be elusive.
What is relatively certain, though,
is that regardless how the Court
rules, litigation will continue over
how much more boards must spend
to educate students with disabilities. Accordingly, it behooves SBOs
and other education leaders to keep
abreast of developments such as
Endrew F. in the ever-changing world
of the law of special education.
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